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Abstract 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
There is a generally accepted need to decrease the environmental impact and global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions caused by the food industry. Studies have shown that by altering the 
consumption patterns of food products, the emissions of GHG can be substantially lowered 
(Carlsson-Kanyama and González, 2009). Climate labeling for food products is an example of a 
policy instrument recently initiated in many countries in order to inform consumers, influence 
choices about food consumption and thereby reduce GHG emissions of the industry. Even though 
the interest in climate labeling schemes is growing all around the world little evidence exist 
showing that climate labeling schemes are actually an effective policy instrument in mitigating 
GHG emission in the food industry. There is a recognized need for better understanding of 
consumer response and demand for climate labels.  This is the first study to report results from a 
randomized controlled field experiment in which the researcher manipulates product labels to 
estimate demand effects of a climate label across multiple retail stores. The experiment was 
conducted in a Swedish setting by studying the sales of climate certified milk products, certified 
according to the standards of a Climate Certification of Food (CCF). This experiment has found 
that the climate certification has a positive effect on sales of the labeled product. Sales of the 
climate labeled product rose by 6 percent when the information about the climate certification 
was provided the consumers. However, the climate label can still only be justified as a policy 
instrument if the labeling system actually reduces GHG emissions. Another finding in this 
experiment is that the increase in sales of climate certified milk is due to a substitution effect 
from mainly organically produced milk, which also has an enhanced environmental quality. This 
finding suggests that the total environmental impact has not changed much with the information 
about the climate label provided the consumers.  
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1. Introduction 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
How is consumer demand of climate labeled food products affected when consumers are being 
presented information about decreased climate impact of the food product through a certified 
climate label?  Yet, no one really knows. The aim of this thesis is to answer this question by 
studying the direct effect on sales when a food product is claimed to be climate friendly through a 
certified climate label on milk. The papers main contributions is supplying the first causal 
estimate on the effect of a certified climate label on consumers’ consumption patterns and to give 
hints on the effectiveness of climate labeling in mitigating climate impact of food consumption. 
The scientific consensus on climate change is that the Earth's climate system is unequivocally 
warming. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions generated as a result of human activities (for example burning of fossil fuels, 
agriculture and deforestation) are with at least 90 percent certainty the main cause of climate 
change. The challenge for policy makers is to develop short-term strategies that can bend the 
global GHG emission curve to buy time, reduce costs and build support for more efficient 
approaches (SEPA, 2008). To identify economically efficient ways of progressing toward 
reductions in GHG emission, it is essential to analyze the climate impacts of food products and 
consumption patterns (see for instance Vandenberg et al, 2011). 
Food consumption and production accounts for a large proportion of the global GHG emissions 
(see e.g. Steinfeld et al, 2006). According to a study undertaken for the European Commission, 
30 percent of the various environmental impacts of private consumption are caused by the food 
industry (Tukker et al., 2006).  Current trends in food consumption patterns point toward 
increased demand for food with large environmental impacts and more environmentally friendly 
diets need to be identified (Carlsson-Kanyama and Lindén, 2001). Studies have shown that by 
altering the consumption patterns of food products, the emissions of GHG from food 
consumption can be substantially lowered (Carlsson-Kanyama, 2004; Carlsson-Kanyama and 
González, 2009). But, how to change these consumption patterns is not yet recognized.  
Policy makers sometimes look to consumer demand for solutions to environmental policy 
problems. When policy makers set out to directly influence private sector environmental 
behaviors, via prohibitions, permits or taxes, tensions and conflicts are usually explicit. The 
provision of information to consumers, through labels and certifications, appears less 
confrontation and public programs that disseminate information about the environmental 
attributes of products are becoming an increasingly popular tool of government agencies and 
organizations. Climate labeling for food products is an example of a voluntary agreement 
initiative recently introduced by food producers, retailers and labeling organizations all around 
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the world in order to inform consumers, reduce the GHG emissions of the industry, and stimulate 
energy efficiency throughout the food supply chain (PCF World Summit, 2012).  
Skeptics have on the other hand been concerned that such programs may not significantly 
influence the behavior of consumers and that implementing yet another labeling scheme might be 
more confusing rather than educational (see e.g. Stern, 1999). Although consumers in market 
surveys often maintain that they will take into account information on environmental aspects of 
food products in their purchasing decisions, there has been little empirical evidence of actual 
behavior along these lines. Nevertheless, changing consumer behavior can make a significant 
difference to the environment and research can help policy makers understand this behavior. As 
Leire and Thidell (2005), Thøgersen et al. (2010) and Cohen and Vandenberg (2012) emphasize, 
there is a significant need for a better understanding of consumer response to climate labels. 
This is the first study to report results from a randomized controlled field experiment in which the 
researcher manipulates product attributes, such as labels, in order to estimate demand effects of a 
climate label across multiple retail stores. According to a recent study of Cohen and Vandenberg 
(2012), previous related empirical research in the field has relied almost exclusively upon 
estimating models of demand using observational data of product sales and through consumer 
surveys with a variety of techniques (and restrictions) applied.  
More specifically, the Swedish climate certification on milk from the dairy company Sju Gårdar 
will be studied by performing a randomized controlled field experiment in 17 major chain 
grocery stores north of Stockholm. Milk is considered to be a suitable consumer good for this 
study, because there is no significant difference between the taste and use of the various brands, 
i.e. the good is homogenous. The only thing that justifies the price difference between climate 
labeled and non-climate labeled milk is thus the extra production costs arising from lowering 
GHG-emissions from production. Furthermore, the large volume of sales of milk is advantageous 
and since milk is produced by livestock production it is also a product with high environmental 
impact.  
1.1 Motivation and research question   
The main question this thesis seeks to answer is: How are sales of climate labeled milk affected 
when consumers are being presented information about decreased climate impact of the food 
product through a certified climate label? 
For a climate labeling scheme to actually decrease GHG emissions and environmental impact, 
consumers need to substitute away from  more environmentally damaging goods (i.e. non-climate 
labeled milk) to more environmentally friendly goods (i.e. climate labeled milk). Therefore, it is 
also of interest to study the potential substitution effects on other milk products such as 
conventional produced milk and organically produced milk, when consumers receive information 
that the milk from Sju Gårdar is more climate friendly than other diary brands. Furthermore, the 
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thesis will also seek to answer the following sub questions: Do consumers substitute away from 
non-climate labeled milk to climate labeled milk when being presented information about 
decreased climate impact of the food product through a certified climate label? If so, does the 
substitution mainly occur from conventional milk or organically labeled milk? 
The scope of literature in this field is still limited. This study is therefore exploratory and will 
provide original field evidence of consumer behaviors that can be foundational to an emerging 
literature discussing the welfare implications and the usefulness of climate labels on food 
products. The intention of this study is therefore to guide important further research in the field. 
However, to be able to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of a climate label to mitigate GHG 
emissions, a broader analysis would need to be conducted that also takes into account the 
reduction of GHG emissions and implementation costs of climate labeling schemes (Teisl and 
Roe, 2005; Hogan and Thorpe, 2009). The main focus of this thesis is to study the demand and 
consumer’s behavioral changes of implementing a certified climate label. Studying demand 
effects usually implies that prices are considered. In this analysis prices of the studied milk 
products have been constant over the experimental period and will thus not be incorporated in the 
modeling framework.  Neither the policy perspective or trade issues regarding climate labels will 
be analyzed. 
1.2 Disposition 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives a historical background 
about climate labels as well as a description about the Swedish climate labeling scheme. A 
summary of what identifies an effective climate labeling scheme will be given. In Chapter 3 a 
theoretical economic background of climate labeling from the consumer perspective will be 
established by reviews of previous research both theoretical and empirical on the impact of 
climate labels on consumer demand of food products. Furthermore, Chapter 4 describes the 
methodology of the study, the experimental design and the model to be estimated and the tests 
that will be conducted. Chapter 5 analyzes and presents the results of the experiment. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will discuss the findings and give the concluding remarks of the thesis.     
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2. Background about the climate label  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The world’s first climate label (called the Carbon Reduction Label, CRL) appeared 2007 in the 
United Kingdom (UK). The initiative was founded by the Carbon Trust, a private company set up 
by the UK government. The launch of the climate label was driven by the governmental target; 
reduce GHG emissions in the UK by 60 percent from 1990 levels by 2050. Its preliminary aim 
was to demonstrate the commitment of companies to decrease the GHG emissions of their 
products (Carbon Trust, 2006). This label, printed on the packet with the Carbon Trust's “black 
footprint”, presents the carbon footprint measurement in CO2 equivalents and an endorsement by 
the Carbon Trust (the label is displayed in Appendix I, Figure 3). Companies that choose to place 
the CRL on products agree to undertake a comprehensive carbon audit of their supply chains and 
commit to reducing GHG emissions over a two year period. This methodology is referred to as 
Publicly Available Specification (PAS 2050).   
Since then, many other countries have followed in the footsteps of the UK and a wide range of 
labels addressing a product’s climate impact aspects are now appearing. Many private actors and 
organizations, as well as governments are investing in, or are considering implementations of 
climate labeling schemes. All around the globe product climate labeling is gaining more interest 
and companies across all sectors increasingly assess and communicate the environmental and 
climate impact of their goods and services1
Hitherto, there is no consensus of what kind of labeling scheme that would be most effective in 
reducing GHG emissions. So far most climate labels have been designed to give quantitative 
information of how much GHG emissions a product causes during its life-cycle (carbon footprint) 
according to the PAS 2050 methodology. Other schemes have been designed as a logo or 
certification indicating that a product is produced with special consideration taken to reduce GHG 
emissions, where a claim of emissions reduction also may be communicated. The rationale for 
the certified climate label is to reﬂect a strengthened and pro -active environmental commitment 
by the producer.  
. Although most consumers might not have noticed 
them yet, there is a lot going on behind the scenes.  
The Swedish climate label initiative builds on the aforementioned certification system, but differs 
in one way from all other existing climate label initiatives. This initiative is called Climate 
Certification of Food (CCF) and was introduced in the Swedish market in 2010 by the major food 
certification organizations KRAV2 and Swedish Seal (Svenskt Sigill)3
                                                 
1 For a summary of existing implementations of different climate labeling schemes worldwide see PCF World Summit, 2012.  
. Key industry groups and 
2 KRAV is a member of IFOAM and a key player in the Swedish organic market. In 1993 the KRAV organization was approved 
as a public authority for the control of ecological holdings by the Swedish ministry of agriculture. In 2002 a market research 
survey revealed that 93 per cent of the consumers in Sweden were familiar with this label (KRAV, 2006). 
3 The Swedish Seal production criteria ensure high food quality, good animal welfare and decreased environmental impact. To 
make sure that the farmers follow the rules a third party makes regular audits.   
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food producers have also joined the project4
The CCF standards are divided into 15 regulatory packages for the different food producers
, as well as The Swedish Board of Agriculture 
(Jordbruksverket).  The approach is to produce a climate certification scheme that can be used as 
a plug-in-module for existing environmental labels or standards for food production that already 
sets requirements within environmental protection, animal welfare and social responsibility.  
Therefore, a fundamental requirement for accreditation in the system is that the operation already 
has another quality certification, e.g. an eco-certification. The rationale behind this is that climate 
impact is only one part of the important sustainability issues that must be addressed and that 
focusing on the climate question alone can lead to sub-optimal solutions (CCF, 2012a p. 2). The 
criteria are therefore developed to integrate climate measures with other sustainability issues. For 
example, the criteria promote renewable energy rather than carbon neutral energy, and healthy 
animals rather than high production. 
5
Even if the producers have undertaken new production standards, few consumers are yet aware of 
the climate label. According to an independent project evaluation of the CCF project, a wider 
participation from the retailers is needed in order to influence consumers to more 
environmentally friendly consumption patterns (Futerra, 2012). Also, a broader understanding of 
the market forces and consumer behavior concerning the CCF is desired.  
 and 
defined by a goal to significantly reduce climate impact of food products, taking into account 
what is considered practical and economically achievable throughout the food supply chain 
(CCF, 2012b). By focusing on the most prominent factors with certain large climate impacts, 
such as use of feed based on soy protein, high consumption of fossil fuels, and production with 
nitrous oxides instead of chemical fertilizer, the hope is that the CCF initiative will be effective 
enough to implement. So far, about 50 food products have been certified which include pork, 
vegetables, eggs, milk, flowers, etc.  
2.1 Important aspects of a climate label    
An effective climate label is first and foremost an instrument that indirectly reduces the 
environmental impact and GHG emissions of food.  This can be done in two ways; either by 
influencing consumer choices to stimulate a move away from products with high environmental 
impact to less environmentally damaging products, and/or by encouraging producers to identify 
efficiencies in GHG reduction throughout the supply chain (Vandenberg et al., 2011). For 
example, studies have shown that reducing the consumption of meat and dairy products and 
substitute with vegetarian alternatives would decrease the climate impact from food consumption 
drastically (Carlsson-Kanyama and Lindeén, 2001; Carlsson-Kanyama, 2004).  A vegetarian 
meal can cut emissions down 10 percent of those for a normal beef-based meal and 40 percent 
from those for a meal based on pork (Carlsson-Kanyama and González, 2009). Wallén et al. 
                                                 
4 More specifically, these actors are Milko, Lantmännen, the Federation of Swedish Farmers, Scan and Skånemejerier. 
5 For further reading about the standards please visit http://www.klimatmarkningen.se/regelverket/alla-regler.  
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(2004) also show that a wise choice within the same product category could minimize GHG 
emissions, sometimes even more than a change in diet.  
The food supply chain is a complex system, which consists of many different stages and actors, 
e.g. farmers, suppliers, transport companies, producers, retailers, consumers and waste 
management companies. All these stages and actors generate different environmental impacts, 
including eutrophication, acidification, ozone layer depletion, as well as an impact on climate 
change. Most of the GHG emitted within the food chain in Europe is caused by agriculture, 
accounting for as much as 49 percent of the GHG emissions, followed by the final consumption 
stage with 18 percent and manufacturing with 11 percent (CIAA, 2007).  
Looking at GHG emission from agricultural activities there are many production factors that will 
influence the total GHG emissions from a food product. Some examples are the type of 
agricultural soil and its fertility, the climate of the country of origin, the use of fertilizers, the type 
and amount of energy used at different stages, the type and amount of fuel used for distribution 
and delivery, the efficiency of the equipment, animal health etc. (Olofdotter and Juul, 2008). 
Measuring and verifying the GHG emissions of a food product’s life cycle involves numerous 
assumptions. As practice shows, performing such estimations is not always possible or feasible 
due to sophisticated supply chains, lack of available data, lack of time and financing allocated to 
the evaluation (Olofdotter and Juul, 2008). This can lead to over- or underestimations which 
might question the relevance of the assessment. Therefore, implementing a reliable climate 
labeling scheme which presents the carbon footprint in numbers is significantly challenging. 
Boardman et al. (2007) and White et al. (2007) discuss a wide range of practical issues 
concerning climate labeling. They identify that a major issue with carbon footprinting 
methodologies, such as the PAS 2050, is the high implementation costs. It is also of importance 
that the climate labeling scheme is trustworthy for the consumer.  Products with additional 
quality claims, such as a climate labeled products, allows a producer to engage in opportunistic 
behavior, especially when the buyer is willing to pay a higher price (Karl and Orwat, 2000). 
Because of this reason, the market could face problems with “green-washing”, i.e. selling a 
product that seems to be more environmentally friendly than it really is. Third party verification 
is therefore necessary to guarantee and enhance the reliability and credibility, and hence 
effectiveness, of the label. In addition to this, the abundant amount of environmentally friendly 
labels, logos and brands are perceived by consumers as confusing (Van Amstel et al, 2008; Cason 
and Gangadharan, 2002).  
A climate label must, therefore, be introduced carefully so that it attracts consumer attention in 
competition with all the other information such as brands, fair-trade labels, country of origin, 
different quality labels and nutrition information (Röös and Tjärnemo, 2011; Thøgersen, 2000). If 
the climate label is able to break through to consumers, it can still only be justified if the labeling 
system is designed in such a way that it actually reduces GHG emission. If consumers are 
responsive to the climate information, climate labeling may also encourage producers to invest in 
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low emissions technologies (Hogan and Thorpe, 2009). Low emissions technologies include 
production processes with lower GHG emissions and abatement equipment. Moreover, climate 
labeling may be considered to be a demand pull policy option that encourages technical 
development.  
Clearly there are still many obstacles (and opportunities) to handle regarding climate labeling and 
the research field is still in an early stage. In addition more knowledge needs to be accumulated. 
In the next chapter, a review of influential research in the field is provided.  
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3. Literature review  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The main focus of this chapter lies in reviewing other studies on the impact of climate labels on 
consumer demand of food products. Firstly, a review of the theoretical literature will be given 
and the theoretical economic framework of this thesis will be presented. Secondly, a review of 
empirical studies concerning the topic at hand will be summarized. Because of the recent birth of 
climate labeling, the scope of literature in the field is limited. Even though little evidence has yet 
been generated, much can be learned from studies of similar environmental product labels. 
Therefore, this chapter also builds upon a review of studies carried out on other environmental 
labels with similar characteristics. The nature of scientific evidence in the field so far falls into 
three main categories: (1) theoretical economic modeling; (2) industry and market studies of 
product sales; and (3) consumer surveys of label awareness, use and stated preferences.  
3.1 Theoretical literature review   
The economic theory behind the demand for consumer product labels is well established (see for 
instance Darby and Karni, 1973). A traditional utility-maximizing model of consumer behavior 
assumes that the rational consumer will choose a combination of price and quality that is 
consistent with his/her utility function and constraints (e.g. income). An important assumption of 
utility maximization is that consumers have perfect information about both the price and quality 
they face. Search attributes, such as prize, color or package of a product, are easily determined 
whereas credence attributes are not observed either at the point of purchase or through casual 
experience. The environmental quality attributes of a product are typically in the credence 
category. For example, it is typically not possible for consumers to distinguish between 
production processes that have different environmental impacts when the final consumer product 
is the same (Hogan and Thorpe, 2009). 
The role of a climate label is thus to turn a credence attribute into a search attribute so that 
consumers can easily compare and make more informed utility-maximizing product choice 
decisions (Karl and Orwat, 1999). Producing a food product with lowered GHG emissions 
compared to product substitutes enhances the quality of the products. In other words, the climate 
label will help provide information to enable consumers take into account the environmental 
damage associated with the products and the increased environmental quality of the labeled good 
(Hogan and Thorpe, 2009). Hence, labeling may affect behavior by influencing the consumer at 
the purchase occasion and affect the implicit weights that consumers assign to the different 
product attributes. If the value of additional information exceeds the cost of search for the 
consumers, they will demand this information and utilize it in their purchase decisions. 
Effectively, the climate label decreases the search cost for the information about the increased 
quality of the good. The consumer demand for information on credence attributes is also 
predicated on the assumption that consumers know this attribute exists and that it might vary by 
9 
 
product. Moreover, to demand information consumers need to know the value of it (Grankvist et 
al., 2007).  
Consumer demand for credence attributes, such as a climate label, may be classified as either 
being “altruistic”, i.e. caring for the environment enough to pay for it, or due to the “warm-glow” 
associated with spending money on environmental protection, i.e. feeling good about giving to 
the environment (Cohen and Vandenbergh, 2012). However, because of the free riding problem 
of public goods, one may be skeptical of the whole idea that labels on attributes, that do not yield 
the consumer significant direct benefits, should have any effect on purchase decisions.  
3.2 Theoretical modeling framework  
In this section a modeling framework will be established in order to exemplify the mechanisms 
behind a utility-maximizing decision of a consumer facing information about a certified climate 
label. By using utility functions in revealed preference approaches for measuring the demand for 
public goods and product quality it is possible to illustrate how consumers maximize their utility 
when choosing from a set of alternative products (i.e types of milk) available in a particular 
market. This theoretical framework is along the lines with consumer welfare theory provided by 
Smith and Banzhalf (2004).   
An important assumption for this theory is weak complementarity, i.e. that there is a private good 
that is consumed with the non-market environmental good6
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑥𝑖, 𝑞𝑗(𝑥𝑖))    𝑖 = 1, 2 𝑗 = 0,1  (1) 
. In our case, we assume that the 
quantity consumed of climate labeled milk (private good) is a weak complement to the attribute 
of increased environmental quality (public good). To express this concept formally, consider the 
following case of utility maximization based on the model by Smith and Banzhalf, 2004. 
Equation (1) defines the utility function where information about the attribute of increased 
environmental quality is provided to the consumer.  
where 𝑥1 is a particular climate labeled products (i.e. Sju Gårdar milk) and x2 is a non-climate 
labeled product (all other milk products). The enhanced quality of the public good associated 
with x is denoted as qj(xi), which consumers can take into account if they receive this information, 
represented by q1. If consumers do not know about the gained environmental quality of the 
climate labeled milk then q is denoted q0. An individual must consume a positive amount of the 
weak complement to gain utility, which means that x1 is correlated with the environmental quality 
attribute (q).  
                                                 
6 The concept of weak complementarity was introduced by Karl-Göran Mäler in 1974. 
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The utility functions in (1) represent the aggregate indifference curve of all consumers in the 
market. According to basic neoclassical economic theory, we assume that all consumers 
maximize their utility, subject to a budget constraint.   
  
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈 = 𝑈�𝑥𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖(𝑥𝑖)�     𝑖 = 1, 2                  𝑥𝑖  
 
𝑠. 𝑡.  ∑ 𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝑀         (2) 
 
where 𝑝𝑖  is the price of each product 𝑖, and 𝑀 the available budget of the consumer (income).  
The optimal solution to this constrained maximization problem is where the marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS), equals the relative price of the goods. Thus, consumers seek to find 
combinations of the goods that would keep utility constant at a specified level, holding all other 
variables constant.  
The graph in Figure 1 bellow illustrates how variations in the amount of the public good, q, 
influence the tradeoff between x1 and x2. Each indifference curve in the map holds utility and all 
other goods constant except the two displayed and the level of q. Thus, as we consider variations 
in the x1/x2 tradeoff, the various indifference curves correspond to different levels of q, i.e. with 
and without climate information. Weak complementarity, together with x1 as a nonessential good 
assures that all the constant quality indifference curves for a given level of utility will intersect 
the vertical axis at the same point. The “fanning property” of the indifference curves describes, 
for a given income level, how the choke price pivots about point A with changes in the quality of 
x1. These changes measure the pure substitution effect of information about quality changes.  
Start with a scenario with no information about environmental quality, so that qi is equal to q0, 
and let mm0 be the initial budget line. The equilibrium for this utility maximization problem is 
represented by point B in the graph where the slope of the indifference curve 𝑈�(q0) equals the 
slope of the initial budget line. With weak complementarity, increases in q from q0 to q1 (by 
providing information through a label) are illustrated by a “fanning” of these indifference curves 
about the point A where the indifference curves originate. When there is no consumption of x1, 
(i.e. at point A) the consumer is indifferent to changes of environmental impact. With positive 
levels of consumption of x1, increases in quality information imply that the indifference curve 
will shift down to maintain the same utility level. That is, with quality information we assure that 
progressively smaller amounts of x1 and x2 will be required to realize the same utility. This means 
that the slopes of the indifference curves are steeper with quality information and that the new 
equilibrium will be at point D. Thus, consumers will substitute other milk with climate labeled 
milk and consume the combinations of x13 x23, i.e. the consumption of climate labeled milk will 
increase while the non-climate labeled milk will decrease. This theoretical result will be 
empirically studied in the following chapters.        
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Figure 1. Weak complementary and fanning indifference curves  
                                     Source: Smith and Banzhalf, 2004 
 
3.3 Empirical literature review  
The evidence from consumer survey research shows that consumers will readily express a 
willingness to incorporate climate impact information into consumption decisions. Three Swedish 
consumer survey studies (Toivonen, 2007; Blomqvist, 2009; YouGov, 2010) showed that a very 
high number of Swedes claim that they would buy climate labeled products if they existed; 73 
percent of the respondents in the study by Toivonen (2007), 92 percent in that by Blomqvist 
(2009) and 74 percent according to a study by YouGov (2010), a leading Nordic market research 
company. Similar studies performed in the UK are alike to the Swedish ones with regard to the 
respondents claimed interest in climate labeling of food products (Berry et al., 2008; LEK, 2008; 
Upham and Bleda, 2009; NBS, 2010).  
Even though the demand for climate impact information seems to be large, the positive attitudes 
do not seem to translate into actual behavior. So far, sales of environmentally friendly food 
products account for a very small share, i.e. there is an attitude-behavior gap (Leire and Thidell, 
2005). One explanation for this could be that environmentally friendly consumption suffers from 
the well-known free-rider problem in which caring for collective responsibilities is judged 
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important overall, but avoided by the individual (Ekelund, 2003). Other explanations for the 
attitude-behavior gap are examined by Röös and Tjärnemo (2011) where the researcher reviews 
findings from research on organic food-purchasing behavior and discusses how this can be 
applied to the new field of climate labeling of food. They conclude that the often higher prices on 
environmentally friendly products, and that strong habit is governing food purchasing are two of 
the greatest obstacles which makes changes in consumption behavior hard to achieve. 
Furthermore, the availability of environmentally friendly products are still low in many places, 
there is a lack of marketing and information, a potential lack of trust in the labeling schemes and 
also low perceived customer effectiveness.  
 
Looking at the industry and market studies of product sales, the conclusion seems to be that 
consumers are responding positively to other environmental labels. Teisl et al. (2002) used 
scanner time-series data on U.S. retail sales to investigate the effect of the “dolphin-safe” label on 
the overall market share of canned tuna. The results showed that the market share (relative to 
other canned seafood and meat) rose substantially after the introduction of the “dolphin-safe” 
label. This was identified through changes in aggregate consumption of tuna before and after the 
label was introduced. The paper provides market-based evidence that consumers respond to 
environmental labels. However, as noted by the authors, the lack of cross sectional variation 
implies a limitation in the data. Thus, it is possible that the significant effect of the “dolphin-safe” 
label could have been caused by unaccounted market trends (see for instance Hainmüller, 2011).  
 
Bjørner et al. (2004) also found empirical evidence of significant changes in consumer demand 
on toilet paper following the introduction of a certified Nordic Swan label7
Although the research of Teisl et al. and Bjørner et al. examine other forms of environmental 
labels than climate labels, the results are still interesting. Many studies have concluded that 
similarities in consumer attitudes exist between climate labels and other environmental labels 
(e.g. Röös and Tärnemo, 2011; Cohen and Vandenberg, 2012; Hogan and Thorpe, 2009). The 
. Even though toilet 
paper not can be considered a food product is still a fast moving consumer goods (FMCG), just as 
food, which still makes the results interesting. The study was performed using panel-data of 
actual purchase behavior for about 1600 consumers between 1997-2001 in Denmark. The toilet 
paper with the Nordic Swan label had an increased marginal willingness to pay of 13-18 percent. 
Interestingly, Bjørner et al. found little evidence of a higher willingness to pay for paper towels. 
The authors conclude that this result is due to the fact that there are more environmentally 
friendly substitutes for paper towels (i.e. cloth) and the most environmentally conscious 
consumers might not be purchasing the Nordic Swan label as they are less likely to buy any paper 
towels. This conclusion highlights the importance of considering available product substitutions 
when studying the impact of labeling schemes.  
                                                 
7 The Nordic Swan label is the official sustainability eco-label for the Nordic countries. It is a voluntary license system where the 
applicant agrees to follow a certain criteria, including environmental, quality and health arguments, set outlined by the Nordic 
Eco-labeling in cooperation with stakeholders.  
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Fair Trade label has, for example, been identified as having common denominators with climate 
labeling, e.g. both involve consideration for other distant individuals; for Fair Trade the concern 
is for workers in distant counties and for climate labels with future generations.  
Even more interesting, however, is the study over a traffic light carbon label scheme performed 
by Vanclay et al. (2011).  The study was undertaken in a regular grocery store in Australia with a 
demographic similar to the median for the whole country.  Thirty-seven products in five product 
lines of high-volumes sale items (milk, spreadable butter, canned tomatoes, bottled water, and 
non-perishable pet foods ) were labeled to indicate embodied GHG emissions and sales were 
recorded over a three-month period. Green (below average), yellow (near average), and black 
(above average) footprints indicated GHG emissions embodied in groceries. These signs are 
provided in Appedix I, figure 4. The researchers draw media attention to the study, based on an 
assumption of a need to alert customers about the labels prior to their arrival in store since many 
grocery store customers are unlikely to loiter whilst shopping. The overall change in purchasing 
pattern was small, with black-labeled sales decreasing 6 percent and green-labeled sales 
increasing 4 percent. However, when green-labeled products were also the cheapest, the shift was 
more substantial with a 20 percent significant switch from black- to green-label sales. These 
findings illustrate the potential for labeling to influence consumption patterns to stimulate 
reductions in GHG emissions. Critique of the study is, thus, that the media attention might have 
given biased results, which the researchers also identify. Weaknesses in the experimental design 
made it also impossible for the researchers to isolate the effects of the labels from potential time-
varying or product specific confounding factors, or to compare the effects of environmental 
labels with the effects of alternative types of marketing labels, which limits the ability to 
extrapolate the findings to a broader context. 
The most interesting finding from Vanclay et al. (2011) is the significant result when the price 
and carbon signals coincided (i.e. when green-labeled products were the cheapest alternative). 
This suggests that the combination of a price incentive (via a carbon tax or emissions trading 
system) and a climate label could be effective in reducing the GHG emissions. This also lends 
empirical support to the analysis by Rubik et al. (2007). Other studies have also identified 
positive responses for traffic light labeling schemes. For example Berry et al. (2008) investigated 
the perceptions of five types of labels in focus group interviews and came to the conclusion that a 
traffic light labeling scheme was the most appreciated, since it was familiar and easy to interpret.  
Shewmake et al. (2011) contributes with the first ever theoretical economic model that predicts 
how consumers would respond to better information about the GHG emissions in food production 
through a certified climate labeled. The study is combining information on demand elasticities of 
food products and information of GHG emissions from LCA analysis, which enables the 
researchers to quantify the substitution and complementary relationships between products and 
reduction of GHG emissions. The results show that a climate label could decrease the GHG 
emissions of food production. The largest reductions would be for a label on meat and alcohol. 
But uncertainties still exists and the authors highlight that perverse- and spill-over-effects might 
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exists. They also conclude that a comprehensive carbon tax would result in even lower GHG-
emissions. Although, a certified climate labeling scheme could be a useful policy instrument 
before a more comprehensive climate policy is adopted.   
Cohen and Vandenberg (2012) identifies that there is a need for rigorous empirical research in the 
field, which uses random assignment or quasi-experimental methods. Furthermore, the authors 
claim that such research methods could help identify the causal relationship between climate 
labels and consumer demand. The only study using a rigorous randomized field experimental 
method for studying over the impact of certified food labels on consumer behavior is Hainmüller 
et al. (2011). The label considered in the study by Hainmüller et al. (2011) is the Fair Trade label 
on coffee.  
The experiment was conducted in 26 stores of a major U.S. grocery store chain and was divided 
in two different set-ups; one label experiment and one price experiment. In the label experiment 
the researchers assigned two different 2x2 inch signs (treatment or control) on the coffee bins, 
using a matched pair design random assignment method with a two-group, two-phase crossover 
design, whereby stores with similar characteristics were randomly assigned to a sequence of 
treatment-control or control-treatment. In each store, the treatment or control condition was in 
place for a period of four weeks, after which stores switched to the opposite condition for another 
four weeks. Using a random assignment method gives the researchers possibility to exploit 
within-store and time variations and controlling for external demand chocks.  
In the price experiment the intervention involved raising the prices for the Fair Trade labeled 
coffees. In addition to the price increase, the stores in the treatment condition displayed a 3x3 
inch Fair Trade label sign on the bulk bins containing the coffees that carried the message: “A 
Fair Price to Support Fair Trade”. This massage aimed at inducing consumers to connect the 
higher price specifically with Fair Trade certification. The stores in the control condition, where 
prices were not altered, displayed a Fair Trade label with the message: “Support Fair Trade”. The 
result showed that sales of the two most popular bulk coffees sold in the stores rose by almost 10 
percent when the coffees were labeled as Fair Trade. Overall, the findings suggest that there is 
substantial consumer support for Fair Trade, although a segment of price-sensitive shoppers will 
not pay a large premium for the Fair Trade label.  
The study by Hainmüller et al. (2011) highlights the advantages of using a randomized field 
experimental approach. Therefore, this study will use the same method in order to gauge the 
casual effect of a climate label on demand. However, the randomization procedure will not be 
according a matched pair design in where stores are grouped two by two according to similar 
characteristic. The randomization method used in this study will be returned to in the next 
chapter.   
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5. Method  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Previous research on consumer demand for climate labels has not been able to draw conclusions 
on the causal effect on demand of implementing a labeling scheme. When using empirical market 
methodologies (as for example Bjørner et al., 2004 and Teisl et al., 2002) a limitation imposed is 
that no control group is available and by that no observable cross-sectional variation. Therefore, 
the researchers are restricted to draw conclusions on the causal effect of the environmental label, 
since it is impossible to know if other market trends or demand shocks might have been the actual 
reason for the increased sales of the labeled products. Consumer surveys, focus groups and 
arranged experiments methodologies are also restricted due to the presents of experimental effect 
which results in biased results. An experimental effect, or so called Hawthorn effect8
Therefore, the methodology of this study is to conduct an experiment in a “real-world setting” by 
performing a randomized controlled field experiment. In that way, the problem with experimental 
effects can immediately be rejected (Gerber and Green, 2012). A well designed randomized 
controlled experiment can supply researchers with causal estimates of the effects of a specific 
treatment on a specific population over a certain time period (Duflo et al. 2007). The mechanism 
behind this methodology will be explained subsequently in next section by following Angrist and 
Pischke’s (2008) disposition.  
, occurs 
when the agents know they are being studied and therefore respond in a way they believe the 
researchers want to achieve. 
5.1 Description of method 
In essence a randomized controlled field experiments solve the question of identifying an average 
counterfactual and in turn the causal effect of a treatment. We imagine a state of the world with 
two potential outcomes where the treatment is a binary variable, 
 
Di = 0,1{ }. The outcome of 
interest being measured is denoted by
 
Yi. The question is how the outcome, 
 
Yi, is affected by the 
treatment, 
 
Di. When an agent is exposed to a treatment there are two different potential outcomes 
for the agent (Angrist and Pischke, 2008): 
 
potential_ outcome =
Y1i _ if _ Di =1
Y0i _ if _ Di = 0
 
 
 
 
 
              (3) 
However, since we cannot observe the same outcome of a treatment for the same agent we have 
to look at averages over a population. When comparing groups of individuals we provide an 
                                                 
8 The “Hawthorne effect” was established in 1950 by Henry A. Landsberger  when analysing older experiments from 
1924-1932 at the Hawthorne Works (a Western Electric factory outside Chicago).  
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average over the agents that have been treated and compare that to the group that not has been 
treated. The equation then becomes: 
  
    
biasSelection
iiii
treatedtheoneffecttreatmentAverage
iiii
outcomeaverageindifferenceObserved
iiii
DYEDYE
DYEDYEDYEDYE
_
00
_____
01
____
]1[]1[
]1[]1[]0[]1[
=−=+
=−===−=
      (4) 
In practice, the difference in means between treatment and control groups can be obtained from a 
regression of dummies for each treatment group. In the simplest form of OLS regression 
framework we can estimate the average effect of treatments over a population with  
      iii DY εβα ++=           (5) 
where iY  measures the outcome of interest and the error term, iε , contains all the additional 
determinants of the outcome iY .  The OLS estimator ?̂? is called the difference estimator because 
when the treatment is binary, it is the difference between the average outcome of the treatment 
group and the average outcome of the control group. Thus, ?̂? reveals the magnitude of the 
estimated effect of the treatment, the so called average treatment effect (ATE).  
If the treatments are randomly assigned, then 𝐸�𝜀𝑖�
 
Di� = 0 in Equation (5) and the difference 
estimator ?̂? is regarded as a consistent unbiased estimator (Stock and Watson, 2003). When 
randomizing treatments we also guarantee that there will be no selection into the various 
treatment groups and that assignment to treatment is orthogonal of any characteristics of the 
agents. This solves the problem of selection bias present in equation (4). It also solves the 
possibility of omitted variable bias. If 
 
Di is randomly assigned, then 
 
Di is distributed 
independently of the omitted factors in the error term in equation (5). Thus random assignment of 
 
Di implies that the first least squares assumption in the regression framework holds 
automatically. Furthermore, if the sample is large enough it will be the law of large numbers 
approximate the normal distribution. Given a large enough sample, and complete randomization 
of treatments, the researcher is left with a causal estimate of the effect of the treatment on the 
measured outcome.  
However, some threats to internal validity still exist. These include failure to follow the treatment 
protocol (i.e. non-compliance and/or partial compliance) and attrition (i.e. subjects dropping out 
of the study after being randomly assigned to the treatment or control group). Furthermore, there 
are also some threats to external validity to consider. According to Stock and Watson (2003) 
these threats are:  
- Non-representative sample: The population studied and the population of interest 
must be sufficiently similar to justify generalizing the experimental results.  
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- Non-representative program or policy: The policy or program of interest must be 
sufficiently similar to the program studied to permit generalizing the results.  
- General equilibrium effects: An internally valid small experiment might correctly 
measure a causal effect, holding constant the market environment, but general 
equilibrium effects mean that these other factors are not held constant when the 
program are implemented broadly.  
These threats have been taken into account in the design of the experiment at hand and will also 
be returned to later in the analysis of the results. But first, an explanation of the experimental set-
up and design of this study at hand will be given.   
5.2 Experimental set-up   
The randomized controlled field experiment will be carried through in all grocery stores of Coop 
where the dairy products from Sju Gårdar are distributed. Coop is one of the major grocery store 
chains in Sweden and a leader in sales of organic, environmental and fair trade products9
The total number of Coop grocery stores carrying Sju Gårdar milk is 17 stores, all located in the 
Province of Uppland (north of Stockholm) where the experiment will be carried out. This 
geographical position is convenient since it gives the opportunity to overview and control the 
experiment allowing that the quality of the study is more guaranteed. A list of all the grocery 
stores included in the experiment, as well as a map of the store locations is to find in Appendix II. 
The experiment started on the 6th of April 2013 and ran until the 3rd of May four weeks later. 
. Using a 
major grocery store chain is convenient since the chain covers the spectra of all kinds of 
consumers with different socioeconomic backgrounds. The stores are also of various sizes, from 
smaller convenient stores to large super markets, and both located in rural and urban areas. This 
facilitates drawing conclusions of external validity and extrapolation of the results.  
The milk from Sju Gårdar is also organically produced and was one of the first climate certified 
milk according to the CCF standards, and become certified in June 2010. At that time marketing 
in the form of local radio and television commercial was aired telling that the milk from Sju 
Gårdar was now climate certified. A total of 20 airings spanning over 14 days were conducted 
(Johansson, 2013). The milk from Sju Gårdar is also locally produced and the only climate 
certified milk product in the chosen market area of the study. In Appedix II the three different 
milk packages are displayed (i.e. low-fat: blue package, medium-fat: green package, standard-fat: 
red package).   
Before the experiment was launched a pilot study was conducted in one grocery store in the city 
center of Uppsala10
                                                 
9 Visit www.coop.se for further information.  
. This store was excluded in the main study. The pilot was performed over 30 
days with treatments varying on a daily basis. The treatments of the pilot were in no way similar 
10 Ica Supermarket Torgkassen in the central of Uppsala.  
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to the treatments of this study. Rather the pilot study was a test of the experimental design. The 
main lesson from the pilot was that, in order to minimize the risk of biased estimates, the 
treatment should vary on a lower frequency because of the presence of non-compliance in the 
administrators (i.e. the store personnel) which could threat the internal validity of the experiment. 
Due to this experience, the importance of easy and constructive instructions to the administrators 
was also highlighted and the formulation of the instruction sheet could be clearer for the final 
study. The final instruction sheet does not reveal the full purpose of the study, making the 
administrators blind to the experiment.  
5.3 Description of treatments 
Following the same approach as Hainmüller et al. (2011) the treatments of this experiment also 
consist of two different signs, which come in format of 18x13 cm (see Figure 1). These two signs 
have been randomly introduced in all the 17 stores included in the experiment. The first 
treatment, 𝐷1, is a placement of a sign in the stores, next to the medium-fat milk from Sju Gårdar 
which is the milk with highest sales, reading “Sju Gårdar Milk”. This is the control treatment of 
the experiment and will serve as the counterfactual. Having 𝐷1 as the counterfactual treatment 
allows gauging the pure marketing effect, which always will be present when diverting the 
consumers’ attention to a product (see for instance Hainmüller, 2011). This is convenient, since 
the intention of the experiment is to study the effect of information on climate impact rather than 
the pure marketing effect of introducing a sign. Hence, the second treatment, 𝐷2, is the treatment 
of interest. Treatment 𝐷2 consist of a sign reading “Sju Gårdar, Climate certified milk, We 
decrease our climate impact”. This sign was placed in the same manner as the control treatment.  
 
Figure 2. Treatment 𝐷1 (to the left) and Treatment 𝐷2 (to the right).  
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The reasoning for the claim about decreased climate impact is due to the certified climate label 
being recently introduced in the market and very little marketing or information about the CCF 
standards have been presented. Therefore, few consumers are yet familiar with what the 
certification implies. Since trust and third party monitoring of a climate labeling scheme is 
important for a climate label to be effective, additional information in form of a link to the 
climate certification rules of the CCF standards was also included.  
 
The design of the treatments is crucial for an experiment to be successful (Gerber and Green, 
2012). The treatments of this experiment have been designed according to a factorial structure. In 
other words, the treatments are formed from combinations of levels of sub-treatments, called 
factors, which makes it possible to determine the pure effect of the additional information 
(Gerber and Green, 2012). Therefore, the two signs are similar to each other except the additional 
environmental information. The layout of the signs is consistent with the logo of Sju Gårdar11 
and has been designed in accordance with recommendations and inspiration from specialists in 
the field in order to get a realistic treatment that could be implemented in broader manner even 
after the experiment12
 
.  
5.4 Randomization of treatments  
Random assignment of treatments refers to a procedure that allocates treatments with known 
probabilities that are greater than zero and less than one. Under complete random assignment, the 
probability of being assigned to the treatment group is identical for all subjects, i.e the 17 grocery 
stores (Gerber and Green, 2012). Therefore, treatment status is statistically independent of the 
different stores potential outcomes and background attributes. The randomization procedure of 
this experiment has been conducted by setting a random number seed, using the statistical 
software Stata 12. This enables the randomization procedure to be replicated. The seed as well as 
the algorithms for this procedure is attached in Appendix III.  
The 17 grocery stores were assigned to varying degrees of treatments in approximately normally 
distributed manner (see Table 1 below). This procedure balances the treatment protocol and the 
risk that only large stores would receive treatments is avoided. In Appendix II the full protocol 
over randomizations of treatments is shown. A balanced treatment design also means that we 
have an equal amount of observations in the control and treatment groups; 34 observations in the 
control group and 34 observations in the treatment group.  The decision to not use a matched pair 
design (as according to Hainmüller et al., 2011) is due to that necessary information to form 
blocks was unavailable at the time of the random allocation. The risk of misanalysing the data 
                                                 
11 Visit www.sjugardar.se 
12 More specifically, Anna Richert and Anders Carlborg (project manager and standard developer CCF), Lars Höök 
and Elisabeth Gauffin (board of Sju Gårdar), Per Frösslund (marketing consultant), Elin Röös (researcher, SLU),  
and Mattias Olsson (graphical artist).        
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would therefore have been large. Arguably, using a matched pair design would not either have 
yield better precision for this experiment at hand (Gerber and Green, 2012).        
Table 1. Approximately normally distributed randomization of treatments 
No. of treatments Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
0 4 5.88 5.88 
1 16 23.53 29.41 
2 28 41.18 70.59 
3 16 23.53 94.12 
4 4 5.88 100.00 
    
Total 68 100.00  
In order to avoid failure following the treatment protocol, phone calls were made to all stores on 
the day the signs would be switched. Unannounced visitations to all stores have also been 
conducted during the treatment period. From these check-ups it is possible to draw the conclusion 
that we have one (known) case with partial compliance in which the treatment have been 
switched two days later than what the instructions intended. However, no issues with non-
compliance have been detected, i.e. none of the control groups have been treated and everyone in 
the treatment group has received the treatment.  
As expressed previously in this chapter, it is essential that the treatments are assigned in a random 
manner in order to yield unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect. It is possible to test 
for randomization by checking whether the randomized treatment dummy actually depends on 
any individual characteristics of the entities the treatment was assigned to, in this case the various 
stores (see for instance Gerber and Green, 2012; Stock and Watson, 2007). A test of 
randomization can advantageously be achieved by using a basic OLS regression with the 
treatment dummy as dependent variable on the independent variable of “stores”, and test the null 
hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are zero. Thus, if the treatment is randomly assigned, the 
assignment will be uncorrelated with the regressor. The result from this regression shows that the 
randomization was random and that there is no correlation between treatment and store size (see 
Table 2 below). This dismisses the threat of having failed to randomize treatments and we can be 
confident that we receive an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect. 
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Table 2. Test of randomization 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Treatments 
  
Store 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Constant 0.500*** 
 (0.083) 
  
Observations 68 
R-squared 0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 % level. ** Significant at 5 % level. *** Significant at 1 % level.  
The dependent variable is a dummy of Treatments. 
5.5 Data description 
The data used in this study is panel data over daily register sales and revenue from all 17 stores. 
This data was received from Coops marketing department. The data set includes all kind of milk 
products the stores offer (in total 73 variables). Due to the aim of this study only the milk from 
Sju Gårdar and close substitutes was kept in the final data-set for analysis. These include low, 
medium and standard fat milk in all forms of packages and sizes (either 1 liter or 1.5 liter). No 
extra low fat milk or extra fat milk was considered. Neither was non-lactose milk, milk produced 
from vegetables (e.g. soy or rice milk) or milk with additives and flavors, such as wellness drinks 
and chocolate milks.  
The final data-set included a few missing values for some of the less sold milk products, e.g. low 
fat milk products and some of the organic milk products. The reason for this missing values is 
that some of the smaller sized grocery stores do not carry all milk products. For example Coop 
Nära in Almunge does not offer any organic milk other than Sju Gårdar. Neither does Coop 
Forum in Norrtälje offer the low-fat milk from Sju Gårdar. However, since we can presume the 
statistical concept called Intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis, this is not a major problem (Gerber and 
Green, 2012). ITT analysis includes every subject who is randomized according to randomized 
treatment assignment. It ignores noncompliance, protocol deviations, withdrawal, and anything 
that happens after randomization. ITT analysis is usually described as “once randomized, always 
analyzed”. In that way no imputation of missing values would need to be considered. What we 
want to achieve is an estimate that shows the real picture of the market situation at hand. 
Nevertheless, it is of importance that the consumers have the opportunity to actually by the 
product in focus of the experiment. In order to insure that the missing values of sale do not 
depend on missed out deliveries of Sju Gårdar milk data from order and delivery was collected. 
Furthermore, the data-set was collapsed from daily to weekly observations since the treatments 
where assigned on weekly basis.   
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5.6 Modeling framework  
The quantities of interest in the analysis are the effects of the experimentally manipulated product 
characteristics (i.e. the certified climate label) on sales of the climate labeled milk, and on sales of 
the main alternative milk products that may be affected by substitution. Using the regression 
framework in equation (5) the model to be estimated is    𝑌�𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + ?̂?𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡       (6) 
where 𝑖 = 1,2 and represents the treatments of interest  D1 and D2. The unit of treatment, 𝑗, will 
be various grocery stores, so that 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 17. The time unit, 𝑡, is weeks, so that 𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Thus, there are a total of 𝑗 × 𝑡 = 17 × 4 = 68 observations.  The outcome variable of interest, 
𝑌�𝑗𝑡, will measure average sales of milk per entity of time and the coefficient ?̂? will measure the 
estimated magnitude of the treatment when D2 is presented. Since we are using a randomized 
experimental methodology, no other control variables are necessary (Gerber and Green, 2012). 
One possible and interesting covariate to include would although be prices of each milk product 
category. This information would be possible to include since the information is contained in the 
available data set. The price of the different milk products varies between stores but has been 
constant during the experimental period. Since it is not necessary to include prices for computing 
the ATE, this exercise will be a matter for future research.   
Given panel data better precision of the estimates can be achieved by treating 𝛾𝑗 as between store 
fixed effects, so that the identifying variation for the treatment effects is across time based on 
deviations from store specific means. By also including a set of week fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡, we can 
account for weekly demand shocks that are common to all stores, e.g. week three is a salary 
payment week. Notice that such variations are also directly accounted for via the balanced 
experimental design and the treatment effect coefficients are therefore unaffected by the inclusion 
of the week fixed effects. By including fixed effects, we impose time independent effects for each 
entity (j and i) that are possibly correlated with the regressors. In that way we are estimating the 
pure effect of the treatment by controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity within the stores and 
over weeks (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).  
Furthermore, in order to study the substitution effects the regression framework in Equation (6) 
will also be used by considering  𝑌�𝑗𝑡 as the sum of other milk products substitutes of other brands. 
These milk substitutes of other brands in the 17 stores include Arla and Coops own milk, both 
conventional and organically produced. In order to study both the total effect on sales as well as 
the percentage change, the model in Equation (6) also studied taking the logarithm of Y. The 
results of the regression analysis are presented and further investigated in next chapter.     
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5.7 Hausman test 
In order to receive the highest possible precision of the estimates, a Hausman test was conducted 
before running the regressions. This test is the generally accepted way of choosing between fixed 
and random effects in the regression specification (Gerber and Green, 2012). Statistically, fixed 
effects are reasonable to use with panel data, but may not be the most efficient model to use. 
Random effects will sometimes give better precision as they are a more efficient estimator.  
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis; that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random 
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. If 
the test is insignificant (Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05) then it is arguably convenient to use random 
effects. The Hausman test resulted in that random effects would be more suitable (Prob>chi2 = 
0.9526). Using random effects will in this case yield a higher precision (smaller standard errors) 
and since the random effects are orthogonal to the regressor (treatment dummy) using random 
effects for the analysis would be justified (Gerber and Green, 2012).  
  
24 
 
6. Analysis and Results  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
In Table 3, the results from the main regression are presented. Here, the milk product categories 
have been aggregated over all fat-contents. The three categories are: (1) all climate labeled milk; 
(2) all organically labeled milk; and (3) all conventional produced milk. The result shows that the 
information about the climate label has a positive effect on sales of the labeled milk. The first 
column examines that the average sales of Sju Gårdar milk increased by 1.7 percent when the 
sign with the climate label information was presented. Meanwhile, the sale of the other non-
climate certified milk substitutes decreased. This decrease is mainly represented by a decrease in 
sales of organically produced milk products with a decrease of 4.9 percent compared to 
conventional produced milk products where the decrease in sales only was 0.1 percent (see 
column 2 and 3). However, the results are not statistically significant (p-value>0.10).  
For the regression on organic milk (column 2), one store is missing. This is due to that one of the 
smaller convenient stores (Coop Nära in Almunge) does not carry other organic labeled milk that 
Sju Gårdar and when we take the logarithm of zero, this becomes a missing value. The constant 
represents the average total sales of milk per week over all 17 stores when the control treatment 
was displayed. The total average sale of climate labeled milk over all 17 stores is about 406 
packages when no information about climate certification was presented. This can be compared 
to the total average sale of 2 636 598 milk packages of conventional milk and about 155 milk 
packages of organic labeled milk.     
Table 3. Main results from the experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln Sju 
Gårdar 
Ln 
Organic 
milk 
Ln Conven. 
Milk 
Sju Gårdar Organic 
milk 
Conventional 
milk 
       
Treatment  0.017 -0.049 -0.001 8.223 -8.955 -0.284 
 (0.027) (0.069) (0.020) (10.423) (7.324) (43.834) 
 
Constant 5.675*** 4.686*** 7.483*** 406.344*** 154.757*** 2,636.598*** 
 (0.195) (0.229) (0.213) (112.567) (39.360) (669.630) 
       
Observations 68 63 68 68 68 68 
No. of stores  17 16 17 17 17 17 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 % level. ** Significant at 5 % level. *** Significant at 1 % level. The 
dependent variable is total sales of each product category (represented by the heading to each column) including all fat contents. 
Column 1-3 shows the result in log scale and column 3-4 in sales of packages of milk.  
In the three last rows of Table 3, the same results are presented but measured in units of sold milk 
packages per week. Again, we see an increase in sales of Sju Gårdar milk when the consumers 
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are presented information about the climate certification. This increase is on average 8 packages 
of milk per week. We also see a decrease in the other milk product categories, where the sales of 
organic labeled milk decreased with an average of about 9 packages of milk per week (column 5) 
and the sales conventional milk decreased with less than 1package of milk per week. Neither of 
these results is statistically significant on conventional levels.  
Nevertheless, since this is the first experiment of its kind, and we have no prior knowledge of the 
treatment effect, the estimates still provide interesting and substantive significant results. Despite 
this, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that the average treatment effect of the climate label 
information is zero. To be able to draw such conclusion a larger sample would arguably be 
needed since the standard error declines in proportion to the square root of total observations (N). 
This result warrants further investigation.     
In order to further investigate the robustness of the average treatment effect and the results above, 
Table 4 shows the results of a sub sample when only considering the medium-fat milk products. 
This is convenient since the treatment was displayed in close relation to the medium-fat milk of 
Sju Gårdar because of the large amounts of sales of these products a priori. The first column 
examines the regression result of sales of the climate labeled medium-fat milk on treatment by 
taking the logarithm on the dependent variable. Sales increased by almost 6 percent when 
consumers received information about the climate certification. This result is significant on a 
conventional level (p-value=0.08). Once again, the substitution toward the climate certified milk 
occurred mainly from the organic labeled milk, although this result is not statistically significant 
(p-value>0.10).  
Table 4. Results from regression with only medium-fat milk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln  
Sju Gårdar 
Medium 
Ln 
Conventional 
Medium 
Ln  
Eco 
Medium 
 
Sju Gårdar 
Medium 
 
Conventional 
Medium 
 
Eco 
Medium 
       
Treatment 0.059* -0.008 -0.073 11.278* -7.675 -8.980 
 (0.035) (0.021) (0.100) (6.827) (28.086) (6.657) 
 
Constant 5.189*** 6.959*** 4.145*** 251.729*** 1,528.382*** 89.622*** 
 (0.196) (0.209) (0.221) (69.711) (373.662) (21.818) 
       
Observations 68 68 63 68 68 68 
No. of stores 17 17 16 17 17 17 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 % level. ** Significant at 5 % level. *** Significant at 1 % level. The 
dependent variable is total sales of each product category (represented by the heading to each column) including only medium-fat 
content. Column 1-3 shows the result in log scale and column 3-4 in sales of packages of milk.  
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Due to the pro-announcement of placing the signs in close relation to the medium-fat milk of Sju 
Gårdar it is also of interest to study the potential differences between the three products from Sju 
Gårdar with different fat-contents. Table 5 bellow examines the results from this regression 
analysis. Interestingly, while the sales of the medium-fat milk increased with the climate label 
information the sales of the standard-fat milk decreased with 11 percent, which is a result that is 
significant at a conventional level (p-value=0.036). This result raises the question weather the 
color of the sign might have had an effect to influence consumers? Maybe some consumers 
associated the medium-fat milk to be the only climate certified milk of the three milk product 
from Sju Gårdar (even though all three of them are certified) due to the color of the medium-fat 
milk coinciding with the treatment sign and therefore choose to buy the medium-fat milk instead 
of the standard-fat milk?     
 
Table 5. Results from regression on only Sju Gårdar milk products. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Ln Sju 
Gårdar Low 
Ln Sju 
Gårdar 
Medium 
Ln Sju 
Gårdar 
Standard 
Sju 
Gårdar 
Low 
Sju Gårdar 
Medium 
Sju Gårdar 
Standard 
       
Treatment 0.042 0.059* -0.111** 1.371 11.278* -4.480 
 (0.079) (0.035) (0.053) (3.346) (6.827) (3.976) 
 
Constant 3.528*** 5.189*** 4.264*** 56.932*** 251.729*** 97.711*** 
 (0.315) (0.196) (0.201) (17.681) (69.711) (26.199) 
       
Observations 63 68 68 68 68 68 
No. of stores 16 17 17 17 17 17 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 % level. ** Significant at 5 % level. *** Significant at 1 % level. The 
dependent variable is total sales of each product category (represented by the heading to each column) including all fat contents. 
Column 1-3 shows the result in log scale and column 3-4 in sales of packages of milk. 
6.1 Validity of the results  
It has been possible to investigate threats to internal validity in close proximity due the choice of 
location of the experiment. No attrition or non-compliance has been present in this experiment. It 
is therefore possible to draw conclusions about this particular sample. But even though an 
internally valid experiment might correctly measure a causal effect, general equilibrium effects 
might be a concern if the treatment was implemented broadly. In order to generalize the findings 
of this study to other populations it would be preferable to replicate the experiment in other 
locations.   
Due to the choice of performing the experiment in a major grocery store chain the risk of drawing 
a non-representative sample has been minimized. Nevertheless, the customers visiting other 
grocery chains might differ since Coop offers a broad selection of organically produced food 
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products. The geographical position can also affect the external validity. Many of the smaller 
stores in the experiment were located in the city of Uppsala, one of the major university cities in 
Sweden. If students are more concerned about environmentally friendly consumption than other 
consumers, it would be difficult to draw conclusions concerning a broader population. It can also 
be that students have less money to spend on food and therefore the result might be hard to 
extrapolate.  Many of the stores in the sample were also located in rural areas and in locations 
where a car is necessary for transportation to and from the store (few students have cars). It is 
also important to bear in mind that the food product in focus of this study is only sold in this 
particular region, which makes it impossible to say anything about the external validity of sales 
of this particular product in other markets.      
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7. Discussion and concluding remarks   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The purpose of this study was to study the direct effect on demand when a milk product was 
claimed to be climate friendly through a certified climate label. The main research question to be 
answered was: How are sales of climate labeled milk affected when consumers are being 
presented information about decreased climate impact of the food product through a climate 
label?  
The first key finding of this experiment is that the climate certification has, in fact, a positive 
effect on sales of the labeled product. Sales of the climate labeled medium-fat milk rose by 
almost 6 percent when the information about the climate certification was provided for the 
consumers. In consumer survey research, a by far greater extent of Swedish consumers’ claim 
they would buy climate labeled food products if they would receive this information. However, 
this large expressed demand does not seem to translate into actual demand, which strengthens the 
hypothesis about an attitude-behavior-gap and also highlights the weaknesses of market survey 
methodologies. The increase in sales of about 6 percent, thus, coincides with the effect of sales in 
previous research of other environmental labels. As for example Hainmüller et al. (2011) found 
that the sales of Fair Trade certified coffee rose by 10 percent and Vanclay et al. (2011) found 
that a green carbon label increased the sales of 4 percent when information was provided the 
consumers.   
If the climate label is able to break through to consumers it can still only be justified as a policy 
instrument if the labeling system is actually reducing GHG emissions. In this case, consumers 
need to substitute away from conventional produced milk toward climate labeled milk for the 
label to be effective. Furthermore, this study aimed to answer the following sub questions: Do 
consumers substitute away from non-climate labeled milk to climate labeled milk when being 
presented information about decreased climate impact of the food product through a climate 
label? If so, does the substitution mainly occur from conventional produced milk or organic 
labeled milk? 
The second key finding from this experiment is that the increase in sales of the climate certified 
milk is due to a substitution effect from mainly organically produced milk, which also has an 
enhanced environmental quality. It seems like the segment of “green consumers” receive a 
greater worth for the money spend on milk when the information about climate certification is 
provided. This consumer segment already has an expressed demand for caring for the 
environment enough to pay for it (altruistic consumers), and have re-optimized their consumption 
accordingly. This finding suggests that the total environmental impact from milk consumption 
have not changed much with the information about the climate certification. This finding also 
gives a hint that the effectiveness of climate labeling in mitigating GHG emissions of food 
consumption might not be that large.  
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Furthermore, the finding also strengthens  the results of Röös and Tjärnemo (2011) where the 
researchers conclude that the greatest obstacles for a success of a climate labels is that strong 
habits are governing food consumption decisions. Altruistic consumers that usually buy 
environmentally friendly milk seem to be easier to influence than consumers that habitually buy 
conventional produced milk that also lies in a lower price category. Röös and Tjärnemo (2011) 
also points out that the higher prices on the climate certified product is another obstacle. It might 
be that, in order to change the behavior of the majority of consumers, the climate certified 
product would also need to be within the cheapest product category, i.e. lower in price compared 
to the conventional produced milk. This finding is also supported by the study of Vanclay et al. 
(2011).          
An unexpected finding from this experiment is that the color of the climate label information 
seems to have influenced the purchase decision of the consumers. This result gives a hint that 
color systems arguably could be useful when designing a climate labeling scheme. However, this 
experiment was in no way designed to study this inquiry. Rather it was an unexpected result. 
Further research would need to be conducted in order to draw more precise conclusions. 
Nevertheless, this finding is supported by the study of Vanclay et al. (2011) where the 
researchers used a traffic light carbon label scheme and found that the color system had influence 
over consumer behavior. Berry et al. (2008) also came to the same conclusion, by investigating 
the perceptions of five types of labels in focus group interviews. A suggestion for further research 
is therefore to conduct an experiment in the same manner as the experiment at hand but instead 
introduce a color traffic light scheme. Such an experiment would perhaps be interesting to 
conduct on food products that have been identified by Shewmake et al. (2011) to yield the largest 
decrease of GHG emissions, namely on meat and/or alcohol. 
Through this experiment, a first step has been taken in trying to establish the causal effect that 
providing information through a certified climate label would have on the sales of milk. A further 
step would be to incorporate prices in the experiment in order to study the marginal willingness 
to pay for climate certified products. An interesting aspect for future research would also be to 
incorporate micro data on individual consumer level. In that way, it would be possible to draw 
more precise conclusions on who is affected by the treatment which would facilitate generalizing 
of the experimental results. More product categories as well as different labeling schemes could 
advantageously also be studied in the same manner.  
Climate labeling schemes are being developed in several countries across the world. An 
important challenge is to ensure that climate labeling, if implemented, would represent a cost 
effective instrument in mitigating GHG emissions and a contribution to climate change policy. 
Implementing a reliable climate labeling scheme has been identified to be significantly 
challenging and implies, in most cases, high implementation costs. Therefore, it is of high 
importance that the understanding of consumer response to climate labels is being further 
investigated. In order to study the full effectiveness of a climate label in mitigating GHG 
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emissions a cost benefit analysis could be conducted in which the cost of implementing a labeling 
scheme can be compared to the benefits from a social welfare perspective. It is likely that such 
evidence would be welcomed by policymakers, since this sort of policy tool may be easier to 
implement and enforce than explicit production site regulations and economic policy instrument 
such as taxes, permits and prohibitions.  
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Appendix I – Example of climate labels 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 3. The carbon reduction label provided by the Carbon Trust 
 
 
Figure 4. Labels used in Vanclay et al. (2011) to indicate carbon footprints of grocery items.   
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Appendix II – Experimental features 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6. List of grocery stores included in the experiment 
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Figure 5. Map over store locations (see the red dots) 
 
 
Figure 6. The three milk packages from Sju Gårdar. Red: standard-fat milk, Green: medium-fat, 
Blue: Low-fat (Source: www.sjugardar.se).  
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Table 7. Randomization scheme of treatments over shops 
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Appendix III – Stata features  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The preceding text represents  the STATA-code which was used to obtain the assignments of 
treatments to weeks in stores. This code has been included in order to make it possible to 
replicate the randomization procedure.   
 
/* Sets seed so that randomization procedure may be replicated*/ 
set seed 11331422 
 
/*Set observations equal to number of shops included in the experiment*/ 
set obs 17 
gen store=_n 
sort store 
 
/*Generate the randomized sequence of numbers which helps assign stores to different 
treatments*/ 
gen u=uniform() 
sort u 
 
/*Shops are assigned to varying degrees of treatments in approximately normally distributed 
way*/ 
egen c=seq(), from(1) to(17) 
gen sumtreat=0 if c>=1 & c<2 
replace sumtreat=1 if c>=2 & c<6 
replace sumtreat=2 if c>=6 & c<13 
replace sumtreat=3 if c>=13 & c<17 
replace sumtreat=4 if c>=17 
 
/* Now treatments are randomly assigned within the spectra of four weeks in the shops*/ 
gen treat1=uniform() 
gen treat2=uniform() 
gen treat3=uniform() 
gen treat4=uniform() 
 
drop u c 
reshape long treat , j(week) i(store) 
sort treat 
egen b=seq(), from(1) to (4) by(store) 
gen q=0 
replace q=1 if b==1 & sumtreat==1 
replace q=1 if b==1 & sumtreat==2 
replace q=1 if b<=2 & sumtreat==2 
replace q=1 if b<=3 & sumtreat==3 
replace q=1 if b<=4 & sumtreat==4 
sort store week 
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egen wk=sum(q), by(week) 
tab wk 
reshape wide sumtreat treat wk b q, j(week) i(store) 
 
Results from Hausman test 
 
Test the appropriateness of the random-effects estimator (xtreg, re) 
hausman fixed  
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed          .          Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  treatments |    11.32692     11.27799        .0489318         .823884 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.00 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9526 
